The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games by Pham Do, K.H. & Norde, H.W.
No. 2002-04
THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION
FORM GAMES
By Kim Hang Pham Do and Henk Norde
January 2002
ISSN 0924-7815The Shapley value for partition function form
games1
Kim Hang Pham Do∗,+, Henk Norde∗
∗Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, and CentER,
Tilburg University.
+Department of Economics, and CentER, Tilburg University.
Warandelaan 2, P.O.Box 90513, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands.
Abstract:D i ﬀerent axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the
literature. For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been
axiomatized in several ways. In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the interests for those who plan to make up a cooperative relationship
is how to share their joint proﬁts. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been
proven to be a useful solution concept for cooperative TU games as it provides
a recommendation for the division of the joint proﬁts of the grand coalition,
which satisﬁes some reasonable properties. However, considering an economy
with externalities one can not easily recommend a division of the joint proﬁts
in the same way. For example, in the context of a symmetric Cournot model
with linear cost and demand, Selten (1973) showed that the connection between
the number of competitors and the tendency to cooperate depends on speciﬁc
institutional assumptions about possibilities of cooperation. If ﬁrms are free to
form enforceable quota cartels then cartels (coalitions) may or may not include
all ﬁrms in the market. The cooperative possibilities of a coalition are derived
from equilibrium points of an associated non-cooperative game. In this situa-
tion, one can not employ the usual concept of a game in characteristic function
form (TU game) to predict the outcome (solution) as the ﬁnal proﬁts depend
on the coalition structure which has been formed. This feature, however, has
been captured in the concept of partition function form games due to Thrall
and Lucas (1963): a partition function assigns a value to each pair consisting of
a coalition and a coalition structure which includes that coalition.
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1Based on the axioms which characterize the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) for
cooperative TU games, there are apparently many ways to extend the Shapley
value to games in partition function form (see, for example, Myerson (1977),
Bolger (1989), Potter (2000)). Myerson (1977) derived an eﬃcient value which
is a natural extension of the Shapley value based on three simple axioms. Bolger
(1989) derived an eﬃcient value which assigns zero to dummies and assigns
nonnegative values to players in monotone simple games, whereas Potter (2000)
modiﬁed the regular concept of the dummy player which allows the dummy
player to bring nonnegative worth to the game. All of them are in some way
extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games.
This paper studies another extension of the Shapley value for the class of par-
tition function form games. The eﬃcient value we deﬁne is diﬀerent from pre-
vious authors. The key idea here is to construct a value which is the average
of a collection of marginal vectors. We present a simple formula for calculating
the Shapley value of partition function form games, using a decomposition in
unanimity games.
The paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst brieﬂy recall the main basic features
of partition function form games in the next section. The Shapley value and
unanimity games are introduced in section 3 and section 4. The properties of
t h es o l u t i o nc o n c e p ta r es t u d i e di ns e c t i o n5 . S e c t i o n6d i s c u s s e sa ne x a m p l e ,
demonstrating how the Shapley value can be applied.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1,2...,n} be the ﬁnite set of players. Nonempty subsets of N are
called coalitions. A partition κ of N, a so-called coalition structure,i sas e to f
disjoint coalitions, κ = {S1,...,Sm}, so that their union is N.L e tP(N) be the
set of all partitions of N. For any subset S ⊆ N, the set of all partitions of S is
denoted by P(S). A typical element of P(S) is denoted by κS.
Ap a i r(S,κ) which consists of a coalition S and a partition κ of N to which S
belongs is called an embedded coalition. Let E(N) denote the set of embedded
coalitions, i.e.
E(N)={(S,κ) ∈ 2N × P(N)| S ∈ κ}.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A mapping
w : E(N) −→ R
that assigns a real value, w(S,κ), to each embedded coalition (S,κ) is called a
partition function. The ordered pair (N,w) is called a partition function form
game. The set of partition function form games with player set N is denoted
by PFFG N.
The value w(S,κ) represents the payoﬀ of coalition S, given that coalition struc-
ture κ forms. For a given partition κ = {S1,S 2,...,Sm} and a partition function
w,l e tw(S1,S 2,...,Sm) denote the m-vector (w(Si,κ))m
i=1. It will be conve-
nient to economize brackets and suppress the commas between elements of the
2same coalition. Thus, we will write, for example, w({ijk},{{ijk},{lh}}) as
w(ijk,{ijk,lh}), and w({ikj},{lh}) as w(ijk,lh). For a partition κ ∈ P(N)
and i ∈ N, we denote the coalition in κ to which player i belongs by S(κ,i).
The typical partition which consists of singleton coalitions only, κ = {{1},{2},...,
{n}}, is denoted by [N], whereas the partition, which consists of the grand
coalition only is denoted by {N}. For any subset S ⊆ N, let [S] denote the
typical partition which consists of the singleton elements of S, i.e.[S]={{j}|
j ∈ S}.
Deﬁnition 2.2 A solution concept on PFFGN is a function Ψ, which asso-
ciates with each game (N,w) in PFFGN a vector Ψ(N,w) of individual payoﬀs
in Rn,i.e.Ψ(N,w)=( Ψi(N,w))i∈N ∈ Rn.
3 The Shapley value
The aim of this section is to generalize the Shapley value to the class of partition
function form games. In order to do so we ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of the Shapley
value for the class of TU games. A cooperative TU game is a pair (N,v),w h e r e
N is the ﬁnite set of players and v(S) ∈ R is the worth of coalition S ⊆ N,w i t h
the convention that v(φ)=0 .
Let Π(N) be the set of all bijections σ : {1,2,...,n} → N of N.F o rag i v e nσ ∈
Π(N) and i ∈ {1,2,...,n} we deﬁne Sσ
i = {σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(i)}, and Sσ
0 = ∅. We
construct the vector mσ(v), which corresponds to the situation where the players
enter a room one by one in order σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(n) and where each player is
given the marginal contribution he/she creates by entering. Formally, it is the
vector in Rn deﬁned by mσ
σ(i)(v)=v(Sσ
i ) − v(Sσ
i−1), for any i ∈ {1,2,...,n}.




In order to introduce the Shapley value for partition function form games we
need some more notation. For a given σ ∈ Π(N) and i ∈ {1,2,...,n}, we deﬁne
the partition κσ
i associated with σ and i, by κσ
i = {Sσ
i }∪[N\Sσ
i ]. So, in κσ
i the
coalition Sσ
i has already formed, whereas all other players still form singleton
coalitions. Furthermore, we deﬁne κσ
0 =[ N].
For a game in partition function form we shall deﬁne the marginal vectors as
follows. The marginal vector mσ(w) of a partition function form game (N,w)
again corresponds to a situation, where the players enter a room one by one in




1). If the second player, σ(2), joins then
the two players together can get w(Sσ
2,κσ
2) and the marginal contribution of

















B a s e do nt h e s em a r g i n a lv e c t o r s{mσ(w)}σ∈π(N), we deﬁne the Shapley value








just like its counterpart for TU-games (c.f. Shapley, 1953).
Example 3.1 Consider the partition function form game (N,w) deﬁned
by w(1,2,3) = (0,0,0), w(12,3) = (2,0), w(23,1) = (3,2), w(13,2) = (2,1),
w(123) = 10.
The marginal vectors are:
if σ1 =( 1 ,2,3) then mσ1(w)=( 0 ,2,8)
if σ2 =( 2 ,1,3) then mσ2(w)=( 2 ,0,8)
if σ3 =( 1 ,3,2) then mσ3(w)=( 0 ,8,2)
if σ4 =( 2 ,3,1) then mσ4(w)=( 7 ,0,3)
if σ5 =( 3 ,1,2) then mσ5(w)=( 2 ,8,0)
if σ6 =( 3 ,2,1) then mσ6(w)=( 7 ,3,0).
So, the Shapley value Φ(w)=( 3 ,3.5,3.5). One can verify that the value, intro-
duced by Potter (2000) as well as the value introduced by Bolger (1989), yields
the vector (3.25,3.5,3.25) for this game.2 The diﬀerence between our value and
Bolger’s value stems from the fact that Bolger was considering a diﬀerent col-
lection of marginal vectors. The value, introduced by Potter, is obtained by
considering the sum of an ”average worth” of coalitions.
4 Unanimity games
In this section we will introduce unanimity games for the class of partition
function form games as a generalization of unanimity games for the class of TU
games. We establish a decomposition theorem, which states that every partition
function form game can be written in a unique way as a linear combination of
unanimity games. First, we recall the corresponding concepts for TU games.





if S ⊆ T
otherwise
2For n =3 , the value introduced by Potter coincides with Bolger’s value (Potter, 2000).
4for all T ⊆ N.
The unanimity games {(N,uS)| S ∈ 2N\{φ}} form a basis for the class of all
TU games with player set N. The unique linear expansion of a characteristic








We will now extend the various notions for TU games to partition function form
games.
Let τ =( S,κ) and τ0 =( S0,κ0) be two embedded coalitions of N. We say that
τ is a generalized subset of τ0, denoted by τ v τ0, if the two following conditions
hold
(i) S ⊆ S0
(ii) for every two players i,j ∈ N\S0,S (κ,i) 6= S(κ,j) if and only if
S(κ0,i) 6= S(κ0,j).
So, an embedded coalition τ =( S,κ) is a generalized subset of τ0 =( S0,κ0) if
S ⊆ S0 and if κ0 is the partition which results from partition κ by merging the
players in S0\S with S.
Example 4.1 Let N = {1,2,3,4,5,6},a n dτ = (123,{123,45,6}) ∈ E(N).
Then τ is a generalized subset of τ0 = (1234,{1234,5,6}) but τ is not a gener-
alized subset of τ00 = (1234,{1234,56}).
Now we will deﬁne unanimity games for partition function form games.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let τ =( S,κ) ∈ E(N) be an embedded coalition. The





if τ v τ0
otherwise (4.1)
for every τ0 ∈ E(N).
Example 4.2 Let N = {1,2,3}. Let κ1 =[ N],κ2 = {12,3},κ3 = {13,2},
κ4 = {23,1}, κ5 = {N}, and let τ1 =( 1 ,κ1), τ2 =( 2 ,κ1), τ3 =( 3 ,κ1),
τ4 =( 1 2 ,κ2), τ5 =( 3 ,κ2), τ6 =( 1 3 ,κ3), τ7 =( 2 ,κ3), τ8 =( 2 3 ,κ4),
τ9 =( 1 ,κ4), τ10 = (123,κ3). The Table 1 gives the values of wτ(τ0) for all
embedded coalitions τ and τ0.
5Table 1. The values of unianimity games wτ.
τ \ τ0 τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 τ5 τ6 τ7 τ8 τ9 τ10
τ1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
τ2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
τ3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
τ4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
τ5 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
τ6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
τ7 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
τ8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
τ9 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
τ10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
We can now prove, similarly to the case of TU games, that the unanimity games
form a basis for the class of partition function form games.
Lemma 4.1 If (N,w) is a partition function form game, then there exist uniquely





These numbers are given by µτ =
P
η:ηvτ(−1)|τ|−|η|w(η), where |τ| denotes the
cardinality of coalition T in an embedded coalition τ =( T,κ).
Proof. It is suﬃces to show for the µτ, speciﬁed in the lemma, that w = P





















Now, let η =( S,κ) be such that η v τ0(= (S0,κ0)) and consider the expression P
τ:ηvτvτ0(−1)|τ|−|η|. Note that for every S00 with S ⊆ S00 ⊆ S0 there is precisely
















6If η = τ0 we clearly have
P
τ:ηvτvτ0(−1)|τ|−|η| =1 .
If η 6= τ0, then S ⊆ S0,S6= S0. Hence,
X
τ:ηvτvτ0
(−1)|τ|−|η| =( 1− 1)|S0\S| =0 .
Therefore, we can conclude that
P
τ∈E(N) µτwτ(τ0)=w(τ0) for all τ0 ∈ E(N),
which ﬁnishes the proof.
The following example shows the linear expansion of a partition function
form game (N,w) with respect to the unanimity games wτ.
Example 4.3 Consider the partition function form game (N,w) in Exam-
ple 3.1. Calculating the numbers of µτ, we have µτi =0for i =1 ,2,3,4,6,
µτj =1for j =5 ,7,8,9,a n dµτ10 =6 . So, the decomposition of w is given by
w = wτ5 + wτ7 + wτ8 + wτ9 +6 wτ10.
5 The characterization
In this section we characterize the Shapley value for partition function form
games, that we introduced in the previous section, by eﬃciency, additivity,
symmetry and the null player property.
For S ⊆ N, i,j / ∈ S and k ∈ S, we denote S+i = S ∪{i},S +i,j = S ∪{i,j}, and
S−k = S\{k}.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Let (N,w) be a partition function form game and i ∈ N.
We say that player i is a null player if for all κN\{i} ∈ P(N\{i}) and S ∈ κN\{i},
w(S,κN\{i} ∪ {{i}})=w(S+i,(κN\{i}\{S}) ∪ {S+i}).
Deﬁnition 5.2 Given a partition function form game (N,w) ∈ PFFG,we
say that two players i and j are symmetric if for all κN\{i,j} ∈ P(N\{i,j}) and
S ∈ κN\{i,j},
w(S+i,(κN\{i,j}\S) ∪ {{j}} ∪ {S+i})=w(S+j,(κN\{i,j}\S) ∪ {{i}} ∪ {S+j}).
Let Ψ : PFFG N → Rn be a solution for PFFG N. The solution concept Ψ
(i) is called eﬃcient (EFF) if
n X
i=1
Ψi(w)=w(N,{N}) for all w ∈ PFFGN ;
(ii) is called symmetric (SYM) if for all w ∈ PFFG N, and for all symmetric
players i,j in (N,w),w eh a v eΨi(w)=Ψj(w);
(iii)s a t i s ﬁes the null player property (NP) if for all w ∈ PFFGN, and for
7all i ∈ N such that player i is a null player in (N,w), we have Ψi(w)=0 ;
(iv)s a t i s ﬁes additivity (ADD) if for any two games (N,w1) and (N,w2) in
PFFG N we have Ψ(w1 + w2)=Ψ(w1)+Ψ(w2). Here w1 + w2 is deﬁned
by (w1 + w2)(S,κ)=w1(S,κ)+w2(S,κ) for every (S,κ) ∈ E(N).
Theorem 1 The Shapley value satisﬁes EFF, SYM, ADD, and NP.



























(ii) SYM:L e tw ∈ PFFGN and let i,j be symmetric players in (N,w).L e tσ ∈
Π(N) and let σij ∈ Π(N) be the permutation which is obtained by interchanging




j (w). Since σij ranges over all permutations if σ does, and the
Shapley value is the average of all marginal vectors, we get Ψi(w)=Ψj(w).
(iii) ADD: Obvious.
(iv) NP: Obtained from the fact that if player k is a null player in (N,w) then
mσ
k(w)=0for every σ ∈ Π(N).
Theorem 2 There is a unique solution on PFFGN satisfying EFF, ADD, SYM
and NP. This solution is the Shapley value.
Proof. (i) From Theorem 1, it follows that the Shapley value satisﬁes EFF,
ADD, SYM and NP.
(ii) Conversely, suppose ψ satisﬁes the four properties. We have to show that
ψ = Φ.
















So, it suﬃces to show that for all τ and µτ ∈ R we have ψ(µτwτ)=Φ(µτwτ).
Let τ =( S,κ) ∈ E(N) and µτ ∈ R. For i/ ∈ S ,l e tκN\{i} ∈ P(N\{i})
and T ∈ κN\{i}. Let τ0 denote the embedded coalition (T,κN\{i} ∪ {{i}}) and
8τ00denote the embedded coalition (T+i,(κN\{i}\T) ∪ {T+i}). One easily veriﬁes
that τ v τ0 if and only if τ v τ00, so µτwτ(τ0)=µτwτ(τ00). Hence, i is a null
player of (N,µτwτ). Therefore, by the NP property, we have
ψi(µτwτ)=Φi(µτwτ)=0for all i/ ∈ S. (5.1)
For any two players i,j ∈ S, i 6= j, let κN\{i,j} ∈ P(N\{i,j}), and T ∈ κN\{i,j}.
Denote by τ0 the embedded coalition (T+i,(κN\{i,j}\T) ∪ {{j}} ∪ {T+i} and
by τ00 the embedded coalition (T+j,(κN\{i,j}\T) ∪ {{i}} ∪ {T+j}. One can see
that τ is not a generalized subset of τ0 and not a generalized subset of τ00.
So, µτwτ(τ0)=0=µτwτ(τ00). Therefore, i and j are symmetric players in
(N,µτwτ). Thus, by SYM,
Φi(µτwτ)=Φj(µτwτ) for all i,j ∈ S (5.2)
and similarly
ψi(µτwτ)=ψj(µτwτ) for all i,j ∈ S (5.3)
Therefore, EFF and (5.1)-(5.3) imply that
Φi(µτwτ)=fi(µτwτ)=|S|−1µτ for all i ∈ S.
As a corollary of Theorem 2 we get an alternative description of the Shapley
value for partition function form games.





|S|−1µτ for all i ∈ N.
6 An illustrative example
In this section we will apply the Shapley value to oligopoly games in partition
function form. Particularly, we focus our attention on a linear oligopoly market
of a homogeneous good with asymmetric costs, no ﬁxed costs and no capacity
constraints. Such an oligopoly is deﬁned by the vector (b;c) ∈ R
n+1
+ , where
b>0 is the intercept of the inverse demand function, c =( c1,c 2,...,cn) ≥ 0 is
the marginal cost vector. Without loss of generality, assume c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn.





n+1 >c n.3 For each supply (input) vector x =( x1,x 2,..xn),
the price is p(x)=b −
Pn
i=1 xi, whereas player i’s cost and proﬁt( p a y o ﬀ)a r e
Ci(xi)=cixi and
πi(x)=p(x)xi − Ci(xi)=( b −
n X
i=1
xi)xi − cixi. (6.1)
3This assumption is equivalent to the requirement of positive market shares at the equilib-
rium for all players (Zhao, 2001).
9Player i’s reaction curve is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition:
∂πi(x)
∂xi




A Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a vector such that each player’s action xi is a
best response to the complementary choice x−i =( x1,...,xi−1,x i+1,...,xn). This
equilibrium is graphically the intersection point of all reaction curves and alge-




n), is determined by
x∗
i =




and the payoﬀ of player i at this equilibrium is
πi(x∗)=( x∗
i)2 =
[b − (n +1 ) ci +
Pn
j=1 cj]2
(n +1 ) 2 . (6.3)
Now suppose that after suﬃcient communication, some players may agree to
cooperate (for example, players intend to adjust negative externalities which
are caused by decreasing returns to inputs). In such a situation a coalition
structure might form, in which, however, the payoﬀ of coalition S depends on
the behaviour of the players outside S. Notice that the payoﬀ for coalition
S under one coalition structure is diﬀerent from that under another coalition
structure if the number of coalitions is diﬀerent. Assume that the marginal cost
of coalition S is cS =m i n i∈S ci (i.e. a coalition’s most eﬃcient technology can
be costlessly adopted by all players in S). Moreover, if a coalition structure
κ = {S1,S 2,...,S k} is formed, then in equilibrium each coalition S in κ will
choose the total (input) quantity levels to maximize the sum of its members’
proﬁts, given the total inputs of the other coalitions in κ.
Let xSj =
P
i∈Sj xi denote the total input level for a coalition Sj and πSj(x)
denote the proﬁt of coalition Sj under structure κ,




Coalition Sj’s reaction curve under coalition structure κ is also implicitly deﬁned
by the ﬁrst order condition:
∂πSj(x)
∂xSj




The unique equilibrium under the structure κ, (x∗
S1,x ∗
S2...,x∗
Sk), and the equi-
librium proﬁt πSj(x∗) of coalition Sj are deﬁned by
x∗
Sj =







[b − (k +1 ) cSj +
Pk
i=1 cSi]2
(k +1 ) 2 .
The oligopoly game in partition function form (N,w) is determined for every
(Sj,κ) by w(Sj,κ)=πSj(x∗), where x∗ is the equilibrium vector under structure
κ.
To get further illustration of how the Shapley value can be used we specify the 3-
person oligopoly game in partition function form (N,w). The partition function
form game is given by w(1,2,3) = (α,β,γ), w(12,3) = (a1,b 1), w(13,2) =
















(b − 2c1 + c3)2,b 1 =
1
9




(b − 2c1 + c2)2,b 2 =
1
9





Given the ordering of marginal costs, one can easily see that α ≥ β ≥ γ, and
a1 ≥ a2 ≥ b2 ≥ b1. The Shapley value of this game, Φ(w)=( Φi(w))i=1,2,3, can





















(a1 − a2 + β − γ) ≥ 0.
From (6.4) one can see that if players have identical costs, then α = β = γ,
a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 so g1 = g2 =0 . T h eS h a p l e yv a l u eg i v e sa ne q u a lp a y o ﬀ to all
players, i.e. Φi(w)=
g
3. Now increase the marginal costs of players 2 and 3 by
t h es a m ea m o u n t ,i . e .c1 ≤ c2 = c3.T h e na1 = a2, β = γ so g2 =0 . Thus, due
to this increase of costs, the Shapley value reduces the payoﬀ f o rp l a y e r2a n d3
by g1, whereas the payoﬀ of player 1 is increased by 2g1. A further increase of
11the marginal cost of player 3 alone reduces, according to the Shapley value, the
payoﬀ of player 3 by 2g2, whereas the payoﬀso fp l a y e r s1a n d2a r ei n c r e a s e d
by g2.
Example 6.1 The game in partition function form (N,w) associated with
a linear oligopoly market (b;c), where b =2 0 ,c=( 1 ,3,4), given by
w(1,2,3) = (36,16,9), w(12,3) = (53.78,18.78),
w(13,2) = (49,25), w(23,1) = (25,49), w(123) = (90.25).
The Shapley value for this game is Φ(w)=( 4 6 .70,24.71,18.83). This value
indicates the diﬀerent payoﬀs due to the diﬀerent costs of players. If players
have identical costs, i.e. c =( 1 ,1,1), then Φ(w)=( 3 0 .08,30.08,30.08). If the
cost of players 2 and 3 increase by 2 units, i.e. c =( 1 ,3,3), then Φ(w)=
(40.42,24.92,24.92). Hereby, g =9 0 .25, g1 =7 .33,g 2 =1 .96.
For n-person oligopoly games in partition function form, the generalization of
the observations above is straightforward.
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